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Falling into the TRAP: The 
ineffectiveness of ‘undue burden’ 
analysis in protecting women’s 
right to choose 
 
Laura Young* 
 
I. Introduction: Seeing the TRAP for what it is 
 
In July 2012, a federal judge in Mississippi granted a 
temporary restraining order against enforcement of new 
abortion-related state legislation.1 The proposed legislation 
required all physicians associated with abortion clinics in 
Mississippi to maintain admitting and staff privileges at any 
nearby hospital.2 If immediate enforcement of the legislation 
had been permitted, the last remaining abortion clinic in 
Mississippi would have been forced to close.3 The bill exposed 
doctors and clinics without the requisite hospital privileges to 
immediate criminal penalty, in the form of a $1,000-per-offense 
misdemeanor fine.4 Continuing to operate throughout the 
 
  * J.D. Candidate (May, 2014), Pace University School of Law; B.A. (May, 
2007), Mount Allison University. With gratitude for the support of my family 
and friends. 
1. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier (JWHO I), 878 F. Supp. 2d 
714, 720 (S.D. Miss. 2012). In April 2013, the clinic moved for a preliminary 
injunction to challenge the State’s revocation of the clinic’s license. Jackson 
Women’s Health Org. v. Currier (JWHO II), 940 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D. Miss. 
2013). The clinic had attempted (unsuccessfully) to comply with Mississippi 
House Bill 1390 following District Judge Jordan’s 2012 decision in JWHO I. 
JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 417-18 (finding that Jackson Women’s Health 
Organization had met its burden, and granting preliminary injunction 
against state licensure revocation). 
2. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 715; see also H.B. 1390, 2012 Leg., 127th 
Sess. (Miss. 2012) (codified at MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-75-1 (2013)). 
3. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 715. 
4. Id. at 718 (“[A]ny violation of any provision of this chapter . . . [shall 
constitute a misdemeanor and] shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed 
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) for each such offense.” (quoting MISS. 
CODE. ANN. § 41-75-26 (2013))). 
1
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administrative process associated with the granting of hospital 
admitting privileges would have been prohibitive, as the clinic 
would have had to pay ongoing fines until it was in 
compliance.5 The legislation thus placed Jackson Women’s 
Health Organization (“JWHO”) in an untenable position: few if 
any abortion clinics can continue to provide abortion services 
with operating costs increased by $1,000 per practitioner per 
day. Furthermore, the attendant criminal liability would have 
acted as a severe disincentive to abortion practitioners 
operating out of the clinic: although the State promised that it 
would not enforce the criminal aspect of the law until a specific 
period of time had lapsed in order to provide time for the 
doctors to acquire privileges, there was no guarantee.6 This 
lack of guarantee made doctors understandably nervous about 
continuing to provide abortion services without obtaining 
admitting privileges.7 
Yet despite these concerns, the proposed regulation 
appears to pass the ‘undue burden’ test promulgated in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,8 
because it does not seem to have the purpose or effect of 
restricting a woman’s reproductive autonomy in and of itself.9 
Moreover, it is defensible because it is rationally related to the 
recognized legitimate state concern for maternal health.10 
However, the maternal health consequences of non-compliance 
in this instance are minimal.11 Other abortion clinics in 
 
5. Id. (“Each day of continuing violation shall be considered a separate 
offense.” (quoting MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-75-26 (2013))). 
6. Id. at 719-20. 
7. Id. at 719-20; see also Amended Complaint, JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 
714 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (No. 3:12-CV-00436), 2012 WL 3234936. 
8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
9. Id. at 877 (defining ‘unduly burdensome’ legislation as regulation with 
the “purpose or effect” of putting a significant obstacle in a women’s path to 
obtaining an abortion). 
10. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (announcing that in 
order to be deemed constitutional, laws restricting types of abortion available 
to a woman need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest,,as 
distinct from the compelling state interest in marital privacy previously 
discussed in relation to contraceptive use under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 496-98 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
11. Campbell Robertson, Judge Maintains Injunction Against 
Mississippi Law on Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/us/mississippi-abortion-law-injunction-is-
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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Mississippi have been regulated out of existence in similar 
ways,12 reflecting a United States-wide trend13 that American 
pro-choice lobbyists have labeled ‘Targeted Regulation of 
Abortion Providers’ (“TRAP”).14 
TRAP regulations are identifiable in the following three 
ways: (1) a TRAP regulation may be a new measure that 
singles out abortion providers for medically unnecessary 
standards (including building and personnel requirements); (2) 
a TRAP regulation may needlessly address the licensing of the 
clinic and/or charge a fee for licensure that exceeds the 
reasonable amount charged to other less-politically-fraught 
medical clinics; or, (3) a TRAP regulation may unnecessarily 
regulate the place in which abortions may be performed (i.e. 
require that abortions be provided only by hospitals, or 
designate abortion clinics as ambulatory surgical centers, 
thereby subjecting them to heightened standards not necessary 
to ensure the safety of an abortion).15 
Current United States Supreme Court jurisprudence 
permits legislatures to take into account the health of the 
mother when passing abortion-related legislation; however, it 
also imposes an ‘undue burden’ ceiling on such legislation.16 
 
extended.html (“[Legislators] say that such a rule . . . is a necessary 
precaution in case complications occur during a procedure. . . . Jackson 
Women’s Health Organization[] has responded that such complications are 
extremely rare and says that in any case it already has a standing transfer 
agreement with a local hospital . . . .”). Additionally, abortion clinics are 
already regulated at the federal level to ensure maternal health. See, e.g., 
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 
102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2012)); Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936; Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590. 
12. Abortion Laws: And Then There Was One, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21562215. 
13. Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Bucks Tide with Bill to Ease Limits on 
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/nyregion/cuomo-bucks-tide-with-bill-to-
lift-abortion-limits.html. 
14. Lisa M. Brown, The TRAP: Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
Providers, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N 1 (2007), 
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_aborti
on/trap_laws.pdf. 
15. Id. 
16. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
3
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The challenge presented by TRAP regulations is that, when 
each regulation is considered individually, they will not 
constitute ‘undue burdens’ directly restricting a woman’s 
ability to obtain an abortion. Considered in isolation from one 
another, these regulations are even readily defensible, as they 
are ostensibly promulgated to protect maternal health, which is 
a legitimate state interest.17 According to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, these regulations are therefore constitutionally 
sound. 
This situation raises a significant question: is ‘undue 
burden’ analysis sufficient to protect women’s reproductive 
autonomy (right to choose)? Examining this question through 
the prism of the Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. 
Currier injunction decisions,18 I conclude that the capacity of 
the ‘undue burden’ analysis to protect women’s right to choose 
is more limited than previously thought. This conclusion stems 
from three distinct loopholes in Supreme Court abortion 
jurisprudence. First, ‘undue burden’ analysis focuses on 
individual regulations, which might each be constitutionally 
valid when considered in isolation, but which in aggregate 
create an abortion regime that unduly burdens a woman’s 
access to abortion and thereby impinges on her right to 
reproductive autonomy. Second, ‘undue burden’ analysis 
focuses on protecting the demand side of the abortion business 
(i.e. maintaining access from the perspective of the woman 
seeking an abortion) without devoting equal attention to 
protecting the supply side of the abortion economy (i.e. the 
ability of abortion providers to stay in business). This demand-
side emphasis on a woman’s ability to access abortion 
dominates Supreme Court jurisprudence and limits the ‘undue 
burden’ analysis on which women’s reproductive autonomy 
relies.19 In response, opportunistic state legislatures have 
shifted from imposing burdens directly on a woman seeking an 
 
17. Id. at 877-78. 
18. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 715 (S.D. Miss. 2012); JWHO II, 940 
F. Supp. 2d 416, 417 (S.D. Miss. 2013). These decisions, which relate to the 
granting of an injunction rather than to the constitutionality of the 
Mississippi law itself, are tangentially related as examples of TRAP and the 
challenges courts confront when dealing with such legislation. 
19. See Theodore Joyce, The Supply-Side Economics of Abortion, 365 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1466 (2011). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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abortion to imposing burdens on the clinics and individuals 
providing abortions—the supply-side of the abortion economy.20 
Although the effect is the same in that women’s right to choose 
is unduly burdened, there is little within current ‘undue 
burden’ jurisprudence to limit these supply-side regulations.21 
Finally, the development of new medical technologies is leading 
to regulations that do not themselves constitute ‘undue 
burdens’ but that nevertheless put pressure on women to make 
pro-life choices.22 New technology is also changing the meaning 
of existing law. For example, technological advancements are 
making it possible for fetuses to survive outside the womb at 
younger and younger ages, shifting viability from the Wade-
envisioned twenty-eight week benchmark to twenty weeks or 
less.23 
 
20. Joyce, supra note 19, has identified an emerging division between 
treatment of the demand side and the supply side of the abortion regulatory 
regime (“[A]bortion opponents have turned to supply-side restrictions, 
focusing on providers of abortion services.”). 
21. See, e.g., Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 598-602 
(6th Cir. 2006) (determining whether a permanent injunction should be 
vacated in a case where a clinic sought a waiver of a transfer agreement). 
22. E.g., Paula Abrams, The Scarlet Letter: The Supreme Court and The 
Language of Abortion Stigma, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 293, 295 (2013); John 
A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, 
and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327 (2011) (discussing 
mandated sonograms and studies of fetal capacity for pain that suggest an 
earlier threshold than previously thought). 
23. Robertson, supra note 22, at 331. However, developments in 
technology have also led to earlier and earlier detection of pregnancy, and 
thus to earlier and earlier abortion procedures. It is also leading to calls for a 
20-week abortion ban in some states. See Abortion: The 20-Week Limit, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21598684-new-curbs-abortion-are-spreading-20-week-limit. The 20-
week ban is supported by proponents who assert that there is not much 
difference between ability to survive outside the fetus at 20 weeks as 
compared to 24 weeks. Quaere whether pro-life arguments will subsequently 
focus on how little difference there is between 18 weeks and 20. The other 
problem with this, as highlighted by THE ECONOMIST, is that there are 
situations in which the fetus’s fatal or otherwise severe disabilities may not 
be revealed to the parents—through amniocentesis or otherwise—until after 
the 20-week benchmark that pro-life advocates support. The morality of 
determining whether to ‘keep’ a child on the basis of his or her ability level is 
beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is worth noting here that moving 
the choice-deadline up does raise other significant questions regarding the 
availability of abortion where fetal health or even survival are determined 
after the proposed 20-week deadline. This calls into even deeper question the 
Casey Court’s rationale that “[t]he viability line . . . has . . . an element of 
5
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The conclusion that ‘undue burden’ analysis is inadequate 
to protect women’s right to choose requires that alternate 
solutions to the TRAP problem be proposed. Although Congress 
has used its Commerce Clause powers to protect access to 
abortion from pro-life protestors,24 it is increasingly unlikely 
that Congress will act further in such a politically-fraught area 
of law.25 If we are to have protection for abortion clinics and the 
women who require their services, it will have to evolve 
through judicial decision-making.26 The Supreme Court has 
hinted that the right to choose might be protected by a ‘purpose 
and effect’ analysis,27 which echoes Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in the realm of racial discrimination.28 However, 
this solution appears to be equally limited. It seems that 
looking to other areas of law may be required to explore 
 
fairness. In some broad sense, it might be said that a woman who fails to act 
before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the 
developing child.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 
(1992). The Court notes that “[w]e have seen how . . . advances in neonatal 
care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier.” Id. at 860. Yet, 
despite this recognition, the Court maintained that viability was the point at 
which the state’s interests become compelling. Id. at 870; see also Carole 
Joffe, Roe v. Wade at 30: What are the Prospects for Abortion Provision? 35 
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 29 (2003), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3502903.html. Additionally, a 
decision from the Ninth Circuit held that a 20-week ban on abortion violated 
the Constitution. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013). Judge 
Kleinfield reluctant concurrence in Isaacson is worth noting both for its 
recognition that the viability benchmark is an “odd rule” and for its 
interesting analogy to death penalty anesthetization as a possible solution to 
the fetal pain alleged in post-20 week abortions. Id. at 1231-34 (Kleinfield, J. 
concurring). 
24. See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act), 18 
U.S.C. § 248 (2012). 
25. Particularly given Congress’s current difficulties in coming to any 
consensus on any topic. But see Peter Baker, In Speech to Planned 
Parenthood, Obama Criticizes New Abortion Laws, THE CAUCUS (Apr. 26, 
2013, 1:27 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/in-speech-to-
planned-parenthood-obama-criticizes-new-abortion-laws/?src=rechp. 
26. The Court appears reluctant to re-open the abortion debate. See In re 
Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 
2012), cert. denied sub nom. Personhood Oklahoma v. Barber, 133 S. Ct. 528 
(2012) (denying certiorari in a case seeking to change the definition of 
personhood). 
27. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
28. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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solutions to this problem. 
This Comment will first examine existing Supreme Court 
abortion and reproductive autonomy jurisprudence before 
seguing into an exploration of the limits of the ‘undue burden’ 
analysis through the Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. 
Currier temporary and preliminary injunction decisions. The 
final section of this Comment explores potential solutions from 
other areas of constitutional law, and proposes that some 
techniques for limiting the reach of state regulatory power 
might be imported from environmental law,29 which frequently 
must deal with interactions amongst complex regulatory 
regimes. 
 
II. Setting the TRAP: Evolving Supreme Court abortion 
jurisprudence of ‘undue burden’ 
 
Prior to the 1973 landmark Supreme Court abortion case 
Roe v. Wade,30 states were free to regulate abortion providers 
however they saw fit—including banning the procedure 
completely.31 Texas law criminalized abortions unless they 
were performed to save the life of a pregnant woman.32 Roe v. 
Wade arose when Jane Roe, pregnant and unmarried, sought a 
safe abortion in Texas.33 As a result of her inability to find a 
safe and legal abortion provider, Jane Roe brought suit 
challenging the constitutionality of the Texas law, “on behalf of 
herself and all other women similarly situated.”34 She 
challenged the law as void for vagueness, and as a violation of 
 
29. Although initially this may seem to be a stretch, there are 
similarities in the challenges confronting both areas of law. At the moment, 
much of environmental law is generally cast as in terms of an ethical 
dilemma. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
(2004). This is also true of the abortion debate; the possibilities for 
opportunism in state action are also paralleled in environmental law. See 
infra, Part V.B. 
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
31. Abortion Laws: And Then There Was One, supra note 12. 
32. Wade, 410 U.S. at 117-18. 
33. Id. at 120. Legalized abortions are generally considered safer, since 
legalization comes with regulatory requirements around cleanliness and 
standards of care. See Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe 
Abortion Law In Action, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 309, 367 (1994). 
34. Wade, 410 U.S. at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7
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her right to privacy.35 In a much-anticipated decision, the 
 
35. Jane Roe argued that the laws were void for vagueness and that they 
impinged on her right of personal privacy, specifically alleging violations of 
her First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 120. 
The question of standing in the context of this case and similar cases is an 
interesting side-note: 
Here, although Roe’s challenge was joined at the District Court level by an 
intervenor (Dr. Halford, who provided illegal abortions to Texasn women in 
need), and by a childless, non-pregnant couple (the Does, who asserted that 
the statute criminalizing abortion constituted a potential threat to Mrs. Roe’s 
health— – that she had received medical advice urging her not to become 
pregnant, to stop taking birth control, and to terminate any pregnancy that 
might arise), the District Court found that only Roe, members of her class, 
and Halford had standing. Id. at 120-22, 125-29. 
In contrast, the Supreme Court determined on appeal that the Does did not 
have standing because their alleged injury was speculative. Id. at 129. It 
found that Halford also did not have standing as an intervenor, and for a 
similar reason: he made no allegations of any “substantial and immediate 
threat,” and no claim of “harassment or bad-faith prosecution” that would 
enable the Court to find Article III standing, as were required. Id. at 126. Dr. 
Halford had challenged the constitutionality of the Texas law solely as a 
doctor who had previously been arrested for violating Texas abortion laws. 
Id. at 125-26; see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-67 (1986) 
(physician did not have standing because he did not allege a specific injury; 
he could not claim standing existed as general defender of unborn, nor as 
father, nor as physician.) Standing does exist where “[a] physician . . . 
challenge[s] an abortion law that poses for him a threat of criminal 
prosecution.” Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65. A physician has standing when he 
asserts the constitutional rights of others who cannot assert their rights 
themselves, provided that he “demonstrate[] that abortion funding 
regulations have a direct financial impact on his practice.” Id. at 65-66. Roe’s 
standing was also questionable, because the duration of pregnancy is brief 
compared to the appellate process, and yet Article III requires that “an actual 
controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not 
simply at the date the action is initiated.” Wade, 410 U.S. at 125 (collecting 
cases). Nonetheless, recognizing that the procedural rule is impractical in the 
context of a pregnant woman, the Court found that Roe had standing: her 
pregnancy (and pregnancies of women in her class), as well as the injury 
arising out of the Texas law criminalizing abortions was “capable of 
repetition, yet evading review.” Id. (collecting cases). The Court thus brought 
constitutional challenges brought by pregnant women into an historical 
exception to the Article III standing requirement. Id. at 125 (citing S. Pac. 
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). Moreover, Roe had standing 
even though she had not claimed pregnancy at the time she filed suit and had 
terminated her pregnancy by the time her appeal came before the Supreme 
Court. Id. at 124. Nor does the Supreme Court’s recent decision, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, shed any light on this particular contradiction. 133 S. 
Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (dismissing Petitioners for lack of standing because 
they had not “suffered a concrete and particularized injury.”). The 
Hollingsworth petitioners, who were the official proponents of a ballot 
initiative to amend California’s constitution to redefine marriage as a union 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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Supreme Court announced an extension of women’s right of 
privacy36 to encompass their reproductive decisions to carry (or 
not carry) fetuses to term.37 However, the Court also 
determined that there is a countervailing state interest in 
protecting both maternal health and fetal health, thus creating 
a sliding scale of constitutionally valid state regulation (and 
permissible state invasion into women’s privacy rights) at each 
stage of a woman’s pregnancy.38 
Perhaps in the interests of simplifying things by using 
already-established medical benchmarks, the Wade Court 
created a trimester-based framework for assessing the 
 
between opposite-sex couples, had appealed the lower court’s decision 
although the State of California did not. Id. at 2659-60. 
36. The Supreme Court first recognized a right of privacy with respect to 
reproductive decision-making in its plurality decision, Griswold v. 
Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). In that decision, Justice Goldberg 
(joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan) appeared to consider 
that this right could be abridged by the state only on a demonstration of a 
compelling state interest in so doing. Id. at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
Petitioners in that case challenged a Connecticut birth control law that 
prohibited the provision of birth control to married (and unmarried) couples. 
Id. at 480 (opinion of the Court). This decision was based on an inferred right 
of privacy, originating in the Bill of Rights: “specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that 
help give them life and substance.” Id. at 484. Privacy, the Court maintained, 
was just such a right. Id. at 485. However, the Court also recognized that 
there had, to that point, been numerous controversies over the recognition of 
privacy as a fundamental right. Id. at 485 (collecting cases). This raises a 
question about the firmness of the footing on which abortion law has been 
built. The language used by the Court in its affirmation of privacy as a 
constitutionally-protected right—“penumbras, formed by emanations”—
creates only the most tenuous link to the Constitution. Id. at 484. Is 
reproductive autonomy threatened by the erosion of personal privacy in other 
areas of law, for example, the erosion of personal privacy in response to 
perceived terrorist threats? See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 
1138 (2013). Alternately, current events may require the Court to re-examine 
this link and perhaps forge a stronger protection for privacy generally. See, 
e.g., Jill Lepore, The Prism: Privacy in an Age of Publicity, NEW YORKER, June 
24, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/06/24/130624fa_fact_lepore. 
Whether that stronger link will be one that is generally applicable, thereby 
protecting abortion choices, or contextual, will naturally be a question the 
Court will eventually have to confront should it review and re-define privacy 
rights. 
37. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-56. 
38. Id. at 154 (“The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to 
be absolute.”); see also supra note 37. 
9
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constitutionality of abortion-related state regulation.39 
According to Wade, the end of the first trimester was the 
‘compelling point’ at which the State might regulate abortion in 
a manner “reasonably relate[d] to the preservation and 
protection of maternal health.”40 The Court identified a second 
‘compelling point’ at viability: “the State . . . may go so far as to 
proscribe abortion [after viability], except when it is necessary 
to preserve the life or health of the mother.”41 In its decision, 
the Court focused on Jane Roe’s right of privacy, and on Jane 
Roe’s ability to access abortion,42 emphasizing the demand side 
of the abortion economy in this and subsequent decisions. 
On the supply side, the Wade Court provided guidance to 
states seeking to regulate abortion providers by listing types of 
legislation that it considered permissible under its holding. 
Thus, the following types of regulation are, under Wade, 
constitutional actions that a state may take with respect to the 
abortion economy: 
 
[R]equirements as to the qualifications of the 
person who is to perform the abortion; as to the 
licensure of that person; as to the facility in 
which the procedure is to be performed, that is, 
whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic 
or some other place of less-than-hospital status; 
as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.43 
 
Within reason, these criteria are calculated to protect 
maternal health. Exploitation of the loopholes this language 
provides, however, has led to the TRAP regulations seen across 
the United States today. 
In 1992, in the face of significant pressure from the United 
States,44 the Court broadened its definition of permissible 
 
39. Id. at 164-66. 
40. Id. at 163. 
41. Id. at 163-64. 
42. See generally id. 
43. Id. at 163. 
44. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) 
(“Joining the respondents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it has done 
in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule Roe.”). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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supply-side regulations while re-affirming its demand-side 
commitment to women’s reproductive autonomy in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.45 In Casey, 
the Court introduced the term ‘undue burden’ and clarified its 
holding in Wade by eliminating the trimester framework in 
favor of a viability benchmark.46 In so doing, the Court 
explicitly stated that “the trimester framework . . . undervalues 
the State’s interest in potential life.”47 The decision thus shifted 
the balance away from protecting a pregnant woman’s right of 
privacy and toward a state’s ability to impinge on that right. 
The challenge in Casey centered on a series of consent-
related requirements within Pennsylvania law.48 These 
provisions included a requirement that women give ‘informed 
consent’ prior to abortion procedures.49 ‘Informed consent’ 
meant notifying women of the developmental progress of the 
fetus immediately prior to performing the abortion, informing 
them about the potential for paternal liability, and offering 
other state-approved alternatives to abortion (such as adoption, 
etc.).50 Minors could have abortions only with the consent of a 
parent, although judicial exemptions were to be provided in 
exceptional circumstances.51 Married women had to confirm 
that they were seeking the procedure with the consent of their 
husbands.52 
The Court determined that these provisions—with the sole 
exception of the marital consent provision—did not inflict an 
‘undue burden’ on women’s reproductive autonomy.53 The 
Court went on to define unduly burdensome regulation as 
“state regulation ha[ving] the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
 
45. See generally id. 
46. Id. at 873 (“We reject the trimester framework, which we do not 
consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe.”) (citations omitted). 
47. Id. at 873. 
48. Id. at 844; see also 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203-3220 (1990). 
49. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
50. Id. at 844, 881. 
51. Id. at 844. 
52. Id. 
53. See generally id. at 879-901 (discussing each of the challenged 
provisions). 
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abortion of a nonviable fetus.”54 Note that the Court again 
emphasizes the woman’s access to abortion—the demand side 
of the economy—rather than the supply side, i.e. a clinic’s 
ability to provide an abortion. 
The Court also used the Casey decision as an opportunity 
to eliminate the Wade trimester framework, focusing instead 
on viability55 as the critical point at which states’ interests 
might become burdensome on a woman while remaining 
constitutionally valid: “[b]efore viability, the State’s interests 
are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or 
the imposition of a substantial obstacle to women’s effective 
right to elect the procedure.”56 The Court upheld the Wade 
determination that states could proscribe abortion after 
viability, but required that such laws contain maternal-health 
exemptions.57 Additionally, the Court confirmed that the state 
has an interest in both maternal health and the life of the 
unborn fetus from conception.58 These statements seemed 
reasonable; however, the Court went on to discuss state-
legislated regulations: 
 
Numerous forms of state regulation might have 
the incidental effect of increasing the cost or 
decreasing the availability of medical care, 
whether for abortion or any other medical 
procedure. The fact that a law which [sic] serves 
a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the 
right itself, has the incidental effect of making it 
more difficult or more expensive to procure an 
abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only 
where state regulation imposes an undue burden 
on a woman’s ability to make this decision does 
the power of the State reach into the heart of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.59 
 
54. Id. at 837. 
55. Viability is the point at which the fetus can survive outside of the 
womb. Id. at 870. 
56. Id. at 846. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 874 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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This language, particularly the italicized language, 
signaled a shift away from an objective standard and toward a 
legislative-purpose-based or intent-based subjective standard 
that renders the infliction of ‘undue burden’ more difficult to 
prove. The Court additionally determined that 
 
Regulations which [sic] do no more than create a 
structural mechanism by which the State, or the 
parent or guardian of a minor, may express 
profound respect for the life of the unborn are 
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle 
to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose. 
Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a 
state measure designed to persuade her to choose 
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if 
reasonably related to that goal.60 
 
Taken together, these sections of the Casey decision 
condone state legislation that severely constricts women’s 
access to abortions, either physically (through TRAP 
regulations) or emotionally (through mandated sonograms and 
other ‘informed consent’ devices that might create doubt, 
shame, or guilt in an otherwise resolved woman seeking the 
procedure),61 so long as the creation of an ‘undue burden’ is not 
an explicit purpose of the legislation and so long as there is no 
evident, unduly burdensome effect. 
Following the Casey decision, a series of cases out of 
Nebraska forced the Court to refine its definition of ‘undue 
burden.’ In these decisions, the Court further retrenched the 
power of its Wade holding. In 2000, the Court was confronted 
with a Nebraska law that banned two common types of late-
 
60. Id. at 877-78 (internal citation omitted). 
61. See Abrams, supra note 22, at 295 (“Laws mandating invasive 
ultrasounds, biased counseling sessions, and onerous waiting periods, along 
with fetal “‘‘personhood”’’ and fetal pain laws, are intended to shame and 
punish women who seek abortions.”). Abortions are already “something most 
women would rather forget,” according to Dr. Willie Parker, who performs 
abortions at the Jackson Women’s Health Organization Abortion Clinic. 
Alissa Quart, Will Mississippi Close Its Last Abortion Clinic?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 
22, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/will-
mississippi-close-its-last-abortion-clinic/267352/. 
13
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pregnancy abortions, dilation and evacuation62 (“D & E”) and 
dilation and extraction63 (“D&X”).64 The statute severely 
restricted second-trimester abortion options for all women, 
including those whose health and safety were threatened by 
their later-term pregnancies; worse, it had no maternal health 
exemption.65 The Court found the statute unduly burdensome 
and void for vagueness.66 
In 2003, a group of physicians who interpreted this 
decision as requiring a maternal health exception in all 
abortion-proscribing legislation challenged Nebraska’s Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act (“Nebraska Act”) on the grounds that it 
did not contain such an exception.67 The Supreme Court 
reviewed the Nebraska Act, along with a similar challenge out 
of the Ninth Circuit, in its Gonzales v. Carhart decision.68 
Despite the Act’s failure to include a maternal health 
exception, the Supreme Court upheld that legislation as a 
constitutional expression of state concern over maternal health. 
In making this determination, the Court applied what it 
considered the Casey balancing test—assessing the permissible 
expression of a state’s “profound respect for the life of the 
unborn” on the one hand, and the impermissible ‘undue 
burden’ that a state’s exercise of regulatory authority might 
impose on a woman’s right to choose on the other hand.69 
 
62. “D[ilation] & E[vacuation] involves (1) dilation of the cervix; (2) 
removal of at least some fetal tissue using nonvacuum instruments; and (3) 
(after the 15th week) the potential need for instrumental disarticulation or 
dismemberment of the fetus or the collapse of fetal parts to facilitate 
evacuation from the uterus.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 925 (2000). 
63. “The breech extraction version of the intact D & E is also known 
commonly as ‘‘dilation and extraction,’ or D & X.’ In the late second trimester, 
vertex, breech, and transverse/compound (sideways) presentations occur in 
roughly similar proportions.” Id. at 927 (citing Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. 
Supp. 2d 1099, 1108, 1112 (D. Neb. 1998); Maureen Paul et al., A CLINICIANS 
GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION 135 (1999)). 
64. See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 135 (2007) (explaining 
that D&E, of which D&X is a sub-category, is the most common second-
trimester abortion technique). 
65. See generally Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 920-31 (discussing the challenged 
provisions). 
66. Id. at 937-38. 
67. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 132-33. 
68. See id. 
69. Id. at 146 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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Because the Nebraska Act only proscribed one type of late-
pregnancy abortion procedure, and did so with great specificity, 
the Court opined that it was neither void for vagueness nor did 
it unduly burden a woman’s reproductive autonomy.70 
The Court also used its Gonzales decision to explain that 
pre-viability states may regulate abortion so long as the 
regulations are rationally related to the state interest in 
maternal health, and provided that the regulation does not 
impose an ‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right to choose.71 Since 
rational basis review is the least stringent standard of 
constitutional review, this decision grants states significant 
latitude in pre-viability regulation of abortion procedures: any 
regulation related to maternal health—no matter how remote 
the relationship may be—is likely to be upheld under this 
standard. This language represented a substantial departure 
from the ‘narrow tailoring’ to meet a ‘compelling state interest’ 
language of Griswold.72 The Court’s indication that regulations 
will henceforth be subject only to rational basis and undue 
burden review has led to a proliferation of state regulations 
that target abortion providers, shifting legislative undue 
burdens onto the supply-side of the abortion economy. 
Furthermore, the Court’s definition limits ‘undue burden’ 
analysis to individual regulations. The Court repeatedly used 
the phrase “a state regulation”73 when describing what 
 
833, 877-78 (1992)). 
70. Id. at 146-47. 
71. Id. at 158. (“Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not 
impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power . . . in 
furtherance of its legitimate interest . . . to promote respect for life, including 
the life of the unborn.” See also id., 186-87 (Ginsburg, J dissenting). Rational 
basis review permits significant over- or under-inclusiveness in the tailoring 
of a given law. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) 
(upholding a law limiting New York City advertisers to using only their own 
trucks for promotional purposes in the interest of preventing driver 
distraction. The law was substantially under-inclusive but upheld under 
rational basis review nonetheless); cf. N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 
U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding a law prohibiting Methadone users and those in 
rehab from being hired by the Metro Transit Authority when only users were 
considered to pose a substantial danger to public health. The law was 
substantially over-inclusive but upheld under rational basis review 
nonetheless). 
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-498 (1965). 
73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added); see also Okpalobi v. Foster, 
15
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constitutes an unduly burdensome law—a grammatical 
subtlety seized upon by opportunistic state law-makers, who 
have since used individually constitutional regulations to 
develop unconstitutional abortion regimes. These regulations 
are individually constitutional because they masquerade as 
being related to the protection of maternal health and because 
individually they do not appear to pose a threat to women’s 
ability to access abortion. The aggregate effect of these supply-
side regulations, however, is to drive clinics out of business, 
resulting in significant demand-side barriers to abortion.74 
 
 
190 F.3d 337, 357 (5th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 244 F.3d 
405 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A measure that has the effect of forcing all or a 
substantial portion of a state’s abortion providers to stop offering such 
procedures creates a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to have a pre-
viability abortion, thus constituting an undue burden under Casey.” (citing 
Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1465 (8th Cir. 
1995))) (emphasis added). 
74. These significant barriers to abortion predominantly affect 
economically marginalized women, for whom abortion may already be costly 
(up to $450, and largely uncovered by Medicaid; private coverage is also often 
limited), and who cannot travel out-of-state as readily for a variety of 
reasons, or who lack the resources to understand that such an option is 
available. One survey has found that 38 percent of all reproductive-age 
women live in counties without abortion clinics. Dana Liebelson & Molly 
Redden, The Abortion Rate Hits a 30-Year Low, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 3, 2014, 
4:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/abortion-rate-record-
decline-map. Such limited access is exacerbated by many states’ mandatory 
waiting period (up to 72 hours between the initial abortion ‘counseling’ 
session and the procedure itself). See Quart, supra note 61; see also Barry 
Yeoman, The Quiet War on Abortion, BARRYYEOMAN.COM (Sept. 1, 2001), 
http://barryyeoman.com/2001/09/the-quiet-war-on-abortion/ (“But many 
women in outlying areas can’t afford the extra travel or hotel costs—not to 
mention lost wages and childcare expenses—involved in a two-day trip to 
obtain an abortion.”). Recently, news sources have trumpeted a decline of 
nearly 13 percent in abortions in the period from 2008-2011—a return to pre-
Wade numbers. Abortion: The 20-Week Limit, supra note 23. In that same 
period, however, abortion providers have decreased by 4 percent as 
determined by a study released by the Guttmacher Institute. Liebelson & 
Redden, supra note 74. The study also shows that, “[a]bortion clinics . . . 
account for only 19 percent of the facilities that offer abortions, but provide 
63 percent of abortions.” Id. Thus, an apparently negligible 4 percent decline 
in clinic numbers represents a not-negligible decline in actual appointments 
available, and may consequently have a substantial effect on women’s ability 
(let alone right) to choose. There is a significant paucity of cases discussing 
whether out-of-state travel constitutes an ‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right 
to choose pre-viability. See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 
603 (6th Cir. 2006). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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III. TRAPpped: Constitutionally-valid State regulations of  
abortion providers 
 
Every state except Oregon currently imposes some sort of 
restriction on access to abortion.75 A large number of these 
states restrict access by imposing needless regulations on or by 
over-regulating the demand-side of the abortion economy 
(clinics and providers).76 For example, in August 2012, the 
Fifth Circuit allowed Louisiana to revoke abortion licenses 
immediately following discovery of any regulatory violation, 
dismissing a challenge to these regulations for lack of ripeness 
because the plaintiff-clinic and associated doctors had not yet 
been subjected to any revocation of license for minor regulatory 
infractions.77 Previously, in March of 2001, the Fifth Circuit 
determined that a Louisiana statute permitting private action 
in tort for emotional distress could be brought against abortion 
providers.78 Abortion providers challenged the statute, alleging 
injury arising out of the chilling effect such legislation would 
have on them.79 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the challenge for 
lack of standing, holding that the plaintiffs failed to carry their 
burden of proving actual injury.80 Louisiana may be the 
‘incubator’81 for TRAP regulation, but it is far from alone in 
promulgating such discriminatory legislation. 
According to Remapping Debate,82 Oklahoma imposes the 
 
75. Sarah Kliff, All States Except Oregon Now Limit Abortion Access, 
WONKBLOG, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2013, 10:26 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog; see also Mike Aberti, Dozens 
of New State Limits on Abortion Added in 2012, REMAPPING DEBATE (Jan. 30, 
2013), http://www.remappingdebate.org/map-data-tool/dozens-new-state-
limits-abortions-added-2012. 
76. See Aberti, supra note 75. 
77. Choice Inc. of Tex. v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710, 714-16 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
78. Opkalbi, 244 F.3d at 409-10. 
79. Id. at 410 (“[T]he Act will force physicians in Louisiana to cease 
providing abortion services to women because of the potential exposure to 
civil damage claims authorized by the Act. . . . [And] if they are forced to 
discontinue providing their services, the State may have achieved in practical 
terms what it could not constitutionally do otherwise—eliminate abortions in 
Louisiana.”). 
80. Id. at 425-26. 
81. Yeoman, supra note 74. 
82. Sponsored by the Anti-Discrimination Center, Remapping Debate 
17
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largest number of abortion restrictions of any state.83 Most 
recently, Oklahoma added new questions to an abortion 
questionnaire women must complete when they seek an 
abortion.84 Republican Doug Cox, a doctor, criticized the 
addition of these new questions as “an attempt to overburden 
and intimidate abortion providers,” whose administrative costs 
will rise as these new questions are incorporated into their 
practice.85 
In 2011, Kansas promulgated new regulations for abortion 
clinics that stipulate, among other things, room temperature 
and dimensions.86 These discriminatory regulations have not 
been imposed on hospitals in the state, yet must be met by 
abortion clinics if they wish to retain their licenses.87 The 
legislation has been challenged in court: the timeline for 
conformity is short, and the clinic is unlikely to meet its 
deadline.88 
Meanwhile, Virginia’s Health Commissioner resigned in 
October 2012, protesting the enactment of a law that will force 
existing abortion clinics in that state to comply with the same 
 
operates out of New York City and “is committed to covering the full 
spectrum of domestic public policy issues.” About Remapping Debate, 
REMAPPING DEBATE.COM, http://www.remappingdebate.org/about/ (last visited 
April 3, 2014). 
83. Aberti, supra note 75. 
84. These questions make the questionnaire longer and more invasive. 
See H.B. 2015, 54 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2013) (codified at OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738k (West 2013)). 
85. Sean Murphy, Panel OKs Parental Notification Abortion Bills, 
10TV.COM (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/apexchange/2013/02/12/ok--abortion-
parental-notification.html. 
86. The new regulations were promulgated under S.B. 36, 2011 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011), which required the Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment to adopt rules similar to those mentioned above. See Hodes & 
Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Moser, No. 2:11-CV-02365-CM-KMH, 2012 WL 
1831549, at *1 (D. Kan. May 18, 2012); see also Complaint ¶¶ 1-3, 28-53, 
Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Moser, (No. 11-2365) (D. Kan. argued July 1, 
2011), 2011 WL 2582856; Joyce, supra note 19, at 1466. For the temperature 
regulations, see KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-34-134 (2014). 
87. See Complaint, supra note 86, ¶ 46. 
88. See id. ¶¶ 1-3, 28-75; see also John Hanna, Kansas’ Abortion Clinic 
Law Maps Out Details, WICHITA EAGLE (June 28, 2011), 
http://www.kansas.com/2011/06/28/1911589/abortion-clinic-law-maps-out-
details.html. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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regulations that will be imposed on new hospitals.89 Most 
Virginia clinics will have to undergo extensive, costly 
renovation to come into compliance—or, as is more likely, the 
clinics will close for lack of funds to support such remodeling.90 
In Texas, a 2003 regulation required that abortions at 
sixteen weeks or later be performed in hospitals and surgery 
centers—well before the Wade-envisioned viability benchmark 
of twenty-four weeks.91 Few hospitals in Texas offered abortion 
services when the law took effect, and no abortion clinics 
within the state qualified as surgery centers.92 Women past 
sixteen weeks pregnant were thus severely restricted in their 
options and forced to travel, presumably at additional expense, 
to seek abortions. Furthermore, there is currently a TRAP-style 
bill advancing through the Texas legislature that will likely 
result in the closure of thirty-seven of the state’s forty-two 
clinics, largely because of new requirements imposed solely on 
abortion providers mandating door sizes and room dimensions, 
anesthetic pipelines, and other questionable ‘safety’ 
stipulations.93 
In North Dakota, Governor Jack Dalrymple recently 
“signed extreme laws . . . centering on a brazenly 
unconstitutional ban on nearly all abortions once a fetal 
heartbeat is ‘detectable[]’ . . . as early as six weeks into 
pregnancy . . . .”94 Women may not even be aware that they are 
pregnant at that point.95 The New York Times Editorial Board 
 
89. Olympia Meola, Va. Health Commissioner Resigns, Citing Abortion 
Clinic Rules, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 
http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/va-health-commissioner-resigns-citing-
abortion-clinic-rules/article_099db45c-4a2e-5b4b-82e2-56544518789d.html 
(last updated Jan. 16, 2013). 
90. Id. 
91. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.004 (West 2003). 
92. Alan Bavley, Supply-Side Economics and Abortion, KANSAS CITY 
STAR (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.kansascity.com/2011/12/27/3340488/supply-
side-economics-and-abortion.html. 
93. Becca Aaronson, Critics of State Bill Say It Would Restrict Abortions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/us/foes-of-
texas-bill-say-it-would-restrict-legal-abortions.html?_r=0. 
94. Editorial, The Campaign to Outlaw Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/opinion/the-campaign-to-outlaw-
abortion.html. 
95. Id. 
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hypothesizes that the laws were signed into effect to force a 
challenge to Wade to come before the currently “conservative-
dominated Supreme Court.”96 
In Arizona, plaintiffs recently challenged a law that would 
prohibit abortions after only twenty weeks of gestation; the law 
was upheld at the district court level,97 but subsequently 
reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.98 
In Michigan, Governor Rick Snyder recently passed a law 
establishing a screening protocol with the stated purpose of 
“making sure a pregnant person is not being coerced into a 
decision.”99 It is not apparent that any woman has undergone a 
coerced abortion in the state. Pro-choice lobbyists call the bill a 
transparent attempt to “make a difficult decision even more 
difficult” by subjecting women “to a type of interrogation.”100 
The bill includes physical requirements for clinics that will 
likely result in the closure of rural abortion clinics, thereby 
reducing accessibility for rural women.101 Other states are 
confronted with similar laws.102 
These state regulations target surgical abortions; however, 
many states also impose regulations on medical abortion. This 
is another type of demand-side restriction. Medical abortion 
typically involves the prescription of the abortion drug, RU-
486.103 Some states mandate when and how a doctor may 
 
96. Id. 
97. Isaacson v. Horne, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962-64, 972 (D. Ariz. 2012). 
98. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2013). 
99. James B. Kelleher, Governor Signs New Law for Abortion Clinics in 
Michigan, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2012, 7:39 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/29/us-usa-abortion-michigan-
idUSBRE8BS00N20121229. 
100. Id. The bill requires women to disclose whether their abortion is 
voluntary, amongst other details. 
101. Id. 
102. For a comprehensive overview of state-imposed abortion 
regulations, see GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF 
ABORTION LAWS, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (last updated Apr. 
1, 2014); see also Map - State Regulation of Abortion, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/clinic/etc/map.html (last updated 
June 6, 2006); Aberti, supra note 75. 
103. RU-486, also known as mifepristone, is a Food & Drug 
Administration (“FDA”)-approved chemical compound delivered in pill form. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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provide a prescription, including a requirement that the 
woman seeking the drug be physically present when the doctor 
prescribes it.104 Under some states’ regulations, the prescribing 
doctor must also expose the woman to a sonogram and a state-
scripted ‘informed consent’ speech that notifies her of the 
state’s preference for alternatives to abortion.105 
This sampling of state laws illustrates an emerging trend: 
a shift away from targeting demand-side abortion seekers106 
toward regulating the supply-side—clinics and providers—in 
newly restrictive ways, by limiting physicians’ ability to 
provide abortions rather than women’s access to abortion 
 
Access to RU-486, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/30/opinion/access-to-ru-486.html; see also 
Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 
2012). It induces abortion in women up to nine weeks pregnant by interfering 
with hormones critical to early pregnancy. Access to RU-486, supra note 103. 
It is not to be confused with the “morning after” pill. 
104. Fourteen states currently require patients and doctors to be in one 
another’s physical presence in order for an RU-486 prescription to proceed: 
Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
and Texas. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MEDICATION 
ABORTION, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf (last updated Apr. 
1, 2014). 
105. Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed 
Consent: The Medical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling 
Materials, 9 GUTTMACHER POL. REV. 4 (Fall 2006), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/4/gpr090406.html. 
106. Constitutionally valid demand-side regulations include: parental 
and judicial consent requirements for minors, public funding restrictions (no 
funding unless the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest), private 
insurance restrictions, and ‘informed consent’ schemes in which clinicians 
must describe the fetus to the pregnant woman and must perform a 
sonogram so that she can hear the fetus’s heartbeat. See Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844, 881 (1992); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1990); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 
465-66 (1977); see also NAT’L COMM. FOR A HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT, NCHLA 
FACT SHEETS: HYDE AMENDMENT, (Apr. 22, 2008), 
http://www.nchla.org/datasource/ifactsheets/4FSHydeAm22a.08.pdf; Lori 
Montgomery & Shailagh Murray, In Deal With Stupak, White House 
Announces Executive Order on Abortion, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2010), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/white-house-announces-
executiv.html?wprss=44. The Stupak-Pitts Amendment will persist even 
after the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act takes effect. See Murray, 
supra note 106. 
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services.107 These regulations have all severely limited abortion 
options for women, but each has done so under the auspices of 
maternal health, and each has initially targeted the supply-
side of the abortion economy rather than the demand-side, thus 
circumventing the ‘undue burden’ analysis proposed by Casey 
and assumed in its progeny. In the longer run, the effect is the 
same: in states served by few (or no) abortion clinics as a result 
of these regulations, women are forced to travel out-of-state.108 
This inflicts a greater cost on women seeking abortions, 
thereby imposing a burden on their ability to access the 
services they are supposed to be guaranteed (albeit in a 
qualified manner) under Roe v. Wade109 and subsequent 
decisions.110 These women, often already economically 
marginalized,111 must travel further distances and spend more 
money (generally not reimbursed by insurance112) to acquire 
the abortion services to which they are entitled.113 The burden 
that legislatures are imposing on the supply-side abortion 
economy thus shifts to the demand-side. The result is tangible: 
as TRAP-induced clinic closures increase, many women seem to 
be foregoing abortion entirely.114 The Jackson Women’s Health 
 
107. Joyce, supra note 19, at 1466. 
108. Id. at 1468; see also Kliff, supra note 75; Aberti, supra note 75. 
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
110. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). But see Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989) 
(“[A] [s]tate’s decision . . . to use public facilities and staff to encourage 
childbirth over abortion ‘places no governmental obstacle in the path of a 
woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.’” (quoting Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980))). 
111. See, e.g., Quart, supra note 61. 
112. Frequently, this is due to state-mandated limits on insurance 
coverage for abortion procedures. Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, 
The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON 
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 16, (2003) (“[F]our states of the 34 that do not 
fund abortions under Medicaid had legislation prohibiting private insurance 
from covering abortions except under an optional rider at additional cost . . . 
.”). Such limits are constitutionally valid, including those contemplated by 
the Hyde Amendment. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 326-27. The National Abortion 
Federation may be applied to for financial assistance. See Quart, supra note 
61. 
113. See Joyce, supra note 19. 
114. Bonnie Scott Jones & Tracy A. Weitz, Legal Barriers to Second-
Trimester Abortion Provision and Public Health Consequences, 99 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 623, 623 (2009); see also Marshall H. Medoff, State Abortion 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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Organization v. Currier injunction decisions represent the first 
cases in which these issues have been directly addressed by 
courts in underserved states.115 
 
IV. The Mississippi TRAP & the Jackson Women’s Health  
Organization Decisions 
 
A. Background 
 
Plaintiffs in Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. 
Currier are the clinic itself and associated doctors, contesting a 
proposed law (“Regulation”) that requires physicians working 
in abortion clinics to maintain admitting and staff privileges at 
local hospitals.116 The Regulation also requires that the 
physicians be certified obstetricians or gynecologists 
(“OB/GYN”).117 (Despite the World Health Organization’s 
acknowledgement that non-OB/GYNs, including even those 
who are not physicians, are equally capable of providing safe 
abortions.)118 Only one of the doctors at the JWHO clinic had 
 
Policies, Targeted Regulation of Abortion Provider Laws, and Abortion 
Demand, 27 REV. POL’Y RES. 5, 577, 578-79 (2010). The undesirability of such 
an outcome is beyond the scope of this paper. 
115. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 715 (S.D. Miss. 2012); JWHO II, 940 
F. Supp. 2d 416, 417 (S.D. Miss. 2013). 
116. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 715. 
117. Id. 
118. Not only is it unnecessary for abortion providers to be OB/GYN-
specialized, but there is significant literature supporting the contention that 
abortions may be safely and effectively provided even by non-physicians: 
 
For many years now, since first-trimester abortion 
techniques have become so straightforward, it has been 
technically feasible for health professionals other than 
physicians to carry out first-trimester aspiration abortions, 
to provide medication to women for medical abortion, and, 
in both types of procedure, to monitor and follow-up [sic] the 
process to a safe conclusion[] . . . midwives, nurse 
practitioners, clinical officers, physician assistants and 
others [can safely provide these abortions]. 
 
Marge Berer, Provision of Abortion by Mid-Level Providers: International 
Policy, Practice and Perspectives, 87 WORLD HEALTH ORG. BULLETIN 58 (2009) 
(emphasis added), available at www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/1/07-
050138/en/ (collecting sources); see also Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 17-34, 
23
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admitting privileges and was certified for private OB/GYN 
practice when the Regulation was proposed, and he did not 
participate in the majority of the abortions performed at the 
clinic.119 Plaintiffs had applied for and received a temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”), effective on the date the Regulation 
was to come into force.120 However, before the TRO and related 
Regulation took effect, the state adapted the Regulation to 
meet the terms of the initial TRO.121 Plaintiffs therefore 
petitioned for a new TRO given the altered parameters of the 
proposed Regulation, which still threatened the clinic’s ability 
to remain open and the physicians’ abilities to provide 
abortions without fear of criminal sanction.122 Subsequent to 
the granted TRO, the clinic sought to comply with the proposed 
Regulation and failed, leading to its petition in 2013 for a 
preliminary injunction.123 
At the time of the decisions regarding the TROs sought by 
plaintiffs, JWHO was the only abortion clinic remaining in 
Mississippi, largely as a result of a strict regulatory regime 
that had eroded other clinics’ ability to stay in business over 
time.124 The Regulation125 at issue within the JWHO case 
would have resulted in temporary closure of the clinic while 
physicians acquired hospital privileges, which meant that 
women within Mississippi would, for a time at least, have to 
travel out-of-state for abortions.126 The plaintiffs in the case 
sought a temporary injunction against the Regulation, which 
 
JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Miss. 2012) No. 3:12-CV-00436-DPJ-FKB, 
2012 WL 3234936. There is “no difference in complication rates according to 
the provider” and “services provided by experienced physician assistants [are] 
comparable in safety and efficacy to those provided by physicians.” Berer, 
supra note 118, at 59. 
119. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 715. 
120. Id. at 716. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. The changes to the Regulation had an effect on the factors 
balanced in granting a TRO, and ultimately, the court modified its earlier 
ruling. Id. at 715. 
123. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 417 (S.D. Miss. 2013). 
124. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3 (2013) (criminal prosecution of non-
physicians performing abortions; criminal prosecution for physicians 
performing abortions in the absence of compliance with other regulations). 
125. See H.B. 1390, 2012 Leg., 127th Sess. (Miss. 2012) (codified at MISS. 
CODE. ANN. § 41-75-1 (2013)). 
126. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 719-20. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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the court granted in part: Judge Jordan’s decision, handed 
down in July of 2012, permitted the Regulation itself to go into 
effect, but stays the enforcement aspect.127 In 2013, Judge 
Jordan enjoined the state from enforcing the law when 
physicians at the clinic failed to come into compliance because, 
despite applying for admitting privileges at every hospital, they 
could not obtain them.128 
 
B. The Court’s Analyses 
 
In its 2012 temporary injunction decision (“2012 decision” 
or “temporary injunction decision”), the Southern District of 
Mississippi (Jordan, J.) performed a classic injunction 
balancing test, requiring the plaintiffs to prove: (1) a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial 
threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff; (3) that the 
potential injury to the plaintiff outweighs any harm that 
granting the injunction might cause the defendant; and, (4) 
that the injunction would be in the public’s interest.129 The 
same criteria were re-examined in the same court’s 2013 
preliminary injunction decision (“2013 decision” or 
“preliminary injunction decision”).130 
In 2012, Plaintiffs proved irreparable injury by 
highlighting their uncertainty over whether their continued 
work at the clinic throughout the administrative process would 
result in criminal prosecution.131 Although the State had 
promised not to prosecute in the present, it had not promised to 
withhold from future prosecution in the period between the 
Law’s effective date and the physicians’ licensure.132 In 2013, 
when it became apparent that the clinic could not comply with 
the law because the physicians could not obtain the required 
hospital admitting privileges,133 the Southern District of 
 
127. Id. 
128. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 417. 
129. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 716. 
130. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 418. 
131. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 717-19. 
132. Id. at 718. 
133. Physicians sought privileges “at every local hospital”; however, 
“[t]wo hospital [sic] refused to provide applications, and all others rejected 
25
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Mississippi enjoined the State from enforcing the law.134 
In 2012, the court had declined to grant an injunction on 
purely constitutional grounds.135 Instead, the court rested its 
2012 decision on a finding of non-speculative harm that was 
“actual and imminent.”136 (For a TRO to be granted, the 
plaintiff must prove a non-speculative injury).137 In particular, 
the court noted at the time that the “public interest” language 
contained in the supporting administrative law (“the Code”)138 
was vague and presented a possibility of capricious 
interpretation that substantially “chill[ed] . . . [p]laintiffs’ 
willingness to continue operating the Clinic until they obtained 
the necessary privileges.”139 This analysis recognized that 
abortion law encompasses a contentious issue that is uniquely 
vulnerable to politicians’ re-interpretation.140 The relevant 
portion of the Code for revoking licensure within Mississippi 
states, that “the status quo shall be preserved ‘except as the 
court otherwise orders in the public interest.’”141 Contemplating 
that abortion access in particular is affected by sudden shifts in 
what constitutes ‘public interest,’ the court held that this 
language was too vague to provide the plaintiffs with peace of 
mind as they continued to practice in the JWHO clinic.142 The 
TRO was therefore granted, enjoining defendants from using 
the override discussed supra within the Code, and enjoining 
defendants from enforcing the Regulation throughout the 
administrative process.143 The TRO did not preclude the state 
 
the doctors’ applications because they perform elective abortions.” JWHO II, 
940 F. Supp. 2d at 418. 
134. Id. at 417. 
135. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 716 (“Even if an act is unconstitutional, 
it will not be preliminarily enjoined unless the plaintiff proves an irreparable 
harm.”). 
136. Id. 
137. Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 263 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tucker 
Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
138. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-75-23 (2013). 
139. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 719. 
140. Id. (“Given the highly charged political context of this case and the 
ambiguity still present . . . .”). 
141. Id. (quoting § 41-75-23). 
142. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 719. 
143. Id. at 720. 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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from enacting the Regulation.144 
In 2013, however, the Southern District of Mississippi 
performed a deeper constitutional analysis. Judge Jordan used 
the Casey ‘undue burden’ test in what he called an “‘as-applied 
challenge’ because the law affects only this clinic and will force 
its closure.”145 For reasons covered elsewhere in this Comment, 
this is a test that I believe is significantly more likely to arrive 
at a constitutionally-sound outcome, supportive of women’s 
right to choose, than would be the ‘facial context’ approach that 
the Southern District forewent in its 2013 decision.146 In the 
2013 decision, the Southern District also quoted Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, stating, that 
“[i]t is axiomatic that a statute may be invalid as applied to one 
state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.”147 
Judge Jordan confronted a situation that has not been 
explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court: whether forcing 
women seeking abortions to travel out-of-state constitutes an 
‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right to choose. The situation 
provided him with an opportunity to lay groundwork 
predicated on sound constitutional analysis for courts to follow 
in future cases arising out of comparable facts, in state systems 
that are increasingly antagonistic towards those who seek 
abortion and those who perform it.148 
 
C. Analyzing the Court’s Decisions 
 
The Southern District of Mississippi examined the injury 
to the plaintiffs in this case in a unique way because JWHO is 
the only abortion clinic in the state.149 Atypically, the court 
 
144. Id. 
145. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 419-20 (S.D. Miss. 2013). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 419 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New 
England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006)) (alteration in original). 
148. This note was completed prior to the decision in Planned 
Parenthood Se. v. Strange, which directly addresses this question and, in fact, 
relies in part on JWHO I and II.  ____ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 1320158, 
M.D. Ala, Mar. 31, 2014. 
149. Id. at 417. 
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recognized that this factor would heighten the degree of injury 
plaintiffs might suffer.150 In the temporary injunction decision, 
Judge Jordan hinted that an ‘undue burden’ analysis of the 
sort advocated under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart might be 
warranted with respect to this Regulation and the context in 
which it would operate.151 The clinic’s status as sole provider 
within the state also affected the public utility balancing 
inherent to the third and fourth criteria considered when 
granting or rejecting a request for injunction. The preliminary 
injunction decision made in 2013 explored ‘undue burden’ 
analysis in greater depth as part of the first prong considered 
in injunction cases (“substantial likelihood of success on the 
merits”).152 
In defense, the State supported its contention that the law 
was valid simply because it was rationally related to its 
legitimate interest with language from Gonzales,153 which, as 
noted supra, does appear to support this interpretation.154 
Judge Jordan, noting that ‘undue burden’ analysis has been the 
standard despite the Casey decision being a plurality opinion, 
dismissed the rational basis argument as well, by quoting the 
full section of text on which the State sought to rely: 
 
 
150. In the 2013 decision, the court notes that such an issue has not 
confronted courts since the “‘undue burden”’ analysis was promulgated in 
Casey. Id. at 420-22. The court notes that the closest case is Mazurek v. 
Armstrong, a decision in which the Supreme Court determined that since “the 
disputed law would not require women to travel to a different facility than 
was previously available,” there was no “‘undue burden”’ on a woman’s right 
to choose. Id. at 421 (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974 
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
151. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 717-18. Casey and Gonzales appear 
to extend the Washington v. Davis and Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation investigations of facially 
neutral laws that are unconstitutionally racially discriminatory to the realm 
of abortion law. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), and 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), with Vill. of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For additional discussion see, infra 
Part V.B. 
152. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 421-23. 
153. Id. at 418-19. 
154. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
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Where it has rational basis to act, and it does not 
impose an undue burden, the State may use its 
regulatory power to bar certain procedures and 
substitute others, all in furtherance of its 
legitimate interests in regulating the medical 
profession in order to promote respect for life, 
including the life of the unborn.155 
 
As Judge Jordan notes, this means that there is a two-part 
test required when analyzing the constitutionality of any 
abortion-related law: (1) the law must be rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest (a low threshold to pass); and (2) the 
law cannot impose an undue burden on women’s right to 
choose.156 If the law is not rationally related, then the law is 
unconstitutional under current Supreme Court precedent. If 
the law imposes an undue burden pre-viability, the law is also 
unconstitutional. 
Some might argue that Judge Jordan conflated the 
plaintiffs in the case—the clinic itself, and associated doctors—
with women seeking abortions. Such an argument overlooks 
the fourth factor that must be considered in granting 
injunctions: the public interest factor. Here, the public interest 
factor is so significant—and, moreover, is constitutionally 
based—that women seeking abortions may in fact be 
considered ‘silent’ plaintiffs. In this context, the ‘undue burden’ 
analysis becomes a vital part of the decision, particularly 
because there are no other in-state clinics to accommodate 
displaced patients. 
Unfortunately, limiting the TRO to the enforcement aspect 
of the proposed Regulation while still permitting it to come into 
effect did not address the ultimate issue highlighted by this 
case: the targeted but piece-meal regulation of abortion 
providers that is sweeping states’ legislatures. Nor did the 
preliminary injunction decision of 2013 broach this issue, 
although it did come closer. Admittedly, anything further 
addressing TRAP laws would be beyond the scope of an 
injunction decision. Nonetheless, Judge Jordan does come 
 
155. Id. at 419 (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158). 
156. Id. at 420. 
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tantalizingly close to addressing this concern in his brief foray 
into ‘undue burden’ analysis.157 It is possible that this section of 
the decision will pave the way for future decisions centering on 
potential TRAP laws, particularly if judges recognize, as Judge 
Jordan did here, that the constitutionality of these laws must 
be examined within the context of a given state’s entire 
abortion regime rather than as a stand-alone regulation. If 
thus applied, the Casey/Gonzales ‘purpose and effect’ analysis 
that Judge Jordan glossed over may provide a means to 
counter this emerging threat to women’s reproductive rights. 
 
V. Springing the TRAP: Solutions from Constitutional and 
other areas of law 
 
A. Solutions from Abortion Law: The Freedom of Access to    
 Clinic Entrances (“FACE”) Act—a Commerce Clause-based  
 solution to TRAP? 
 
Targeting the supply side of the abortion economy is not a 
new strategy in the abortion protest movement. Pro-life 
advocates have been doing it for years, using threats and 
outright violence to draw attention to their cause.158 The 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (“FACE”)159 is a 
federal statute designed to ensure that protestors do not hinder 
women’s access to reproductive health services.160 Enacted in 
 
157. Recognizing that a full “‘undue burden”’ analysis was beyond the 
scope of his decision, Judge Jordan began a brief survey of the case law 
nonetheless, with this disclaimer: “Without delving too deeply into the 
analysis at this point.” JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 717 (S.D. Miss. 2012). 
This not only accepts the parameters of the TRO analysis to which he was 
limited, but also indicated his anticipation that this case would make its way 
back to the court. 
158. See NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics: Incidents of Violence & 
Disruption Against Abortion Providers in the U.S. & Canada, NAT’L ABORTION 
FED’N, 
http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/violence/documents/Stats_Table201
1.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) [hereinafter NAF Violence and Disruption 
Statistics]. 
159. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act), 18 U.S.C. § 
248 (2012). 
160. Abortion Facts: Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (“FACE”) Act, 
NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, 
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direct response to increasingly threatening pro-life protest 
tactics,161 FACE restrains demonstrators from protesting 
within a certain distance of any clinic providing abortion 
services.162 
FACE is based in the Commerce Clause, which grants 
Congress authority to regulate the channels and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, “even though the 
threat may come only from intrastate activities.”163 Thus, 
“FACE, [which] directly regulates a commercial activity—the 
provision of reproductive health care services”164 is a 
constitutionally sound exercise of Congress’s regulatory 
power.165 Under this logic, state-imposed rules and regulations 
targeting abortion clinics might be considered constitutionally 
infirm because they similarly discriminate against interstate 
commerce.166 
Unfortunately, given the political tension inherent to the 
abortion debate, it is unlikely that Congress will exercise its 
commerce power in this area in a meaningful way. Targeting 
TRAPs would require a broad-reaching and versatile law that 
Congress is unlikely to be willing to pass. It seems far more 
likely that the abortion regime will develop over time through 
judicial decision-making. 
 
 
 
http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/facts/face_act.html (last visited Apr. 
4, 2014) [hereinafter Abortion Facts]. 
161. Including but not limited to murder, attempted murder, assault, 
kidnapping, arson, bombing, and anthrax threats of or to doctors who provide 
abortions. See NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics, supra note 158. 
162. Rebecca A. Hart & Dana Sussman, About FACE: Using Legal Tools 
to Protect Abortion Providers, Clinics and Their Patients, AM. CONSTIT. SOC’Y 
BLOG (July 1, 2009), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/node/13687; see also 
Abortion Facts, supra note 160. 
163. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citations omitted); 
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
164. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Se. Pa. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp 290, 
295 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
165. Id.; see also United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-20 (8th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 683-84 (7th Cir. 1995); 
Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995). 
166. See, e.g. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). But cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. 
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B. Solutions from Constitutional Law: Discriminatory intent  
 and ‘purpose and effect’ analysis 
 
Within current abortion jurisprudence, both the Casey and 
Gonzales decisions appear to extend the Washington v. Davis 
and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corporation investigations of facially neutral laws 
that are unconstitutionally racially discriminatory to the realm 
of abortion law.167 
Casey and Gonzales both posit that an undue burden might 
exist where a regulation’s purpose and effect is to impede a 
woman’s right to choose.168 Similarly, Davis and Village of 
Arlington Heights posit that a facially neutral law might be 
discriminatory if it can be proved that its purpose or effect is to 
institutionalize racial discrimination.169 The possibility of 
racially-inspired discriminatory intent warrants strict scrutiny. 
In situations where considerations of gender may have led to 
the passage of discriminatory law, the Court employs what 
appears to be an intermediate level of scrutiny.170 
Yet no courts seem to have examined individual, 
innocuous-seeming TRAP regulations that in aggregate create 
a deliberately burdensome regime within either of these 
frameworks of purpose and effect. Indeed, the Court—as 
mentioned above—expressly stated that abortion regulation 
triggers rational basis review. However, discriminatory intent 
is apparent in abortion law: with regard to the Mississippi 
state-legislated requirement that physicians have admitting 
privileges at local hospitals, Republican Governor Phil Bryant 
has stated that “[his] goal of course is to shut [the clinic] 
down.”171 It seems likely that he will realize his ambition: all 
 
167. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), and Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), with Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
168. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146. 
169. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
170. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
171. Tara Culp-Ressler, Mississippi’s Last Abortion Clinic Sends a 
Message: ‘We’re Here, And We’re Not Going Anywhere,’ THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 
31, 2013, 11:36 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/01/31/1519841/mississippi-last-abortion-
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
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seven local hospitals have so far denied licensure to the doctors 
practicing abortions out of JWHO.172 It is difficult to imagine a 
more evident ‘discriminatory’ purpose or effect behind the 
enactment of burdensome legislation. 
In order to be truly effective in combatting TRAP 
regulations, ‘undue burden’ analysis will have to look beyond 
the mere ‘purpose and effect’ of a single regulation being 
brought before the court to explore the regulation’s purpose 
and effect in context. This will require a reframing of the 
abortion regulation discussion, toward a more holistic approach 
that may impose greater burdens on reviewing courts, as they 
will need to explore an entire regime rather than individual 
regulations in assessing those regulations’ constitutionality. 
This solution may not, therefore, be the most judicially 
efficient—but it may be the only one possible. 
This solution is reminiscent of certain solutions within the 
environmental law arena. Environmental law is one of the 
most ‘holistic’ areas of law today. Perhaps because of 
ecosystems’ complexity and the largely-unmapped 
interrelationships between species, environmental law has 
been forced to explore consequences of human activity on a 
large scale.173 This has required courts to expand their 
examinations of single actions to examine the broader context 
in which they are occurring.174 
This expanded contemplation of the ramifications of single 
regulations or activities is most apparent within the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).175 NEPA requires 
federal agencies seeking to undertake projects that will impact 
the environment to submit their plans for an environmental 
 
clinic-message/. 
172. Id. In rural areas and small towns, doctors’ and hospitals’ 
unwillingness to offer abortion due to its controversial nature limits access, 
and thereby potentially increases the stigma associated with deliberately 
terminating a pregnancy. See Amy Norton, Few U.S. Ob-Gyns Provide 
Abortions: Study, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2011, 1:12 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/01/us-abortions-
idUSTRE7804JN20110901. 
173. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
(2004). 
174. Id. 
175. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370h (2012). 
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impact assessment (“EIS”).176 As the program developed, 
however, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), which 
was charged with enforcing the statute,177 found that 
developers were breaking up large projects that would have 
devastating environmental effects into smaller pieces.178 The 
smaller pieces could pass through the EPA review process 
easily because their individual effects were minute. 
The Tenth Circuit’s solution to this problem, announced in 
Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management,179 
was to require that each piece of the project being examined by 
EPA in the EIS process pass an ‘independent utility test.’180 
The Tenth Circuit also acknowledged that NEPA requires that 
“connected actions” be considered when assessing the 
environmental impact of any given project.181 Actions are 
considered “connected” for NEPA purposes if: (1) they trigger 
other actions that will require EIS’s; (2) they “cannot or will not 
proceed unless other actions are taken previously or 
simultaneously”; or (3) they “are interdependent parts of a 
larger action and depend on the larger action for their 
justification.”182 Similarly, certain abortion regulations might 
be deemed discriminatory in purpose and effect when examined 
contextually, as federal activities must be under NEPA. This is, 
therefore, a solution that might be worth importing into the 
abortion ‘undue burden’ discourse. 
 
 
 
 
176. See Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 
2007). 
177. Basic Information, ENVTL PROT AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/nepa.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
178. See, e.g., Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt, 531 
F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The purpose of this requirement 
[determining whether an action is a connected action] is to prevent an agency 
from dividing a project into multiple actions, each of which individually has 
an insignificant environmental impact, but which collectively have a 
substantial impact.” (quoting Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 
955,969 (9th Cir. 2006))). 
179. Id. at 1220. 
180. See id. at 1228-29. 
181. Id. at 1128 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (2013)). 
182. § 1508.25(a)(1). 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Current ‘undue burden’ analysis is inadequate not only for 
the subjectivity inherent to an examination of ‘purpose and 
effect’ but also for its failure to take into account the overall 
effect of a single law within the pre-existing abortion law 
framework within each state. Its focus on the demand side of 
the abortion economy renders it a weak tool in combatting 
TRAPs, and its utility is further eroded by the development of 
new technology that is changing our ability to track 
pregnancies and our ability to enable a fetus to survive outside 
the womb. The inadequacy of ‘undue burden’ analysis is a 
threat to women’s right to reproductive autonomy—a threat 
that current constitutional law is not equipped to counter. 
Given the political divisiveness of the abortion issue, 
Congress or the Supreme Court should consider adopting an 
analytical procedural technique (as opposed to a substantive 
pro-choice bill) that takes into consideration the effect of 
individually constitutional laws that may be designed to 
cumulatively suppress a woman’s right to choose. This 
technique might be adapted from other areas of constitutional 
law, such as the ‘purpose and effect’ inquiry prompted by 
potentially discriminatory race-related legislation, or imported 
from the broader contextual/overall effect inquiry required by 
NEPA. 
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